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Abstract
 
This paper analyses the underlying reasons for the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its
subsequent development in recent years. The paper examines the economic and political factors behind it,
including the role of economic ideas, experts, politicians, institutional arrangements in the Maastricht
Treaty, domestic politics, and the exceptional position of Germany in the realm of monetary integration in
the EU. It concludes that a set of commonly held beliefs together with a corresponding power-political
constellation explain the creation of the SGP.
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung
 
Das Papier analysiert die grundlegenden Bedingungen für das Zustandekommen des Stabilitäts- und
Wachstumspakts (SGP) und seiner Entwicklung in den Folgejahren. Es werden ökonomische und
politische Faktoren untersucht, insbesondere die Rolle wirtschaftspolitischer Vorstellungen und den
Einfluss von Experten, Politikern, institutioneller Regelungen im Maastricht Vertrag, innenpolitischer
Vorgänge und die Sonderstellung Deutschlands im Bereich der Europäischen Währungsunion. Die
gemeinschaftlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen werden als notwendige Bedingung für die
Schaffung des Paktes aufgefasst, und ihr Zusammentreffen mit einer entsprechenden machtpolitischen
Spielkonstellation wird als dessen hinreichende Erklärung verstanden.
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Notes
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
 
In 1997 the European Council adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which was
inspired by a 1995 memorandum written by the then German Finance Minister Theo
Waigel. The SGP institutionalises the deficit limit of three per cent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) laid down in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) for Member States of
the European Union (EU) that participate in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It
regulates procedures of budgetary surveillance and the imposition of financial fines for
unauthorised breeches of the deficit limit. At the time, it was hoped that these sanctions
would effectively serve as a deterrent that was never to be used. Yet in the second half of
2002, the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) was initiated in the cases of Portugal,
Germany, and France (and it is possible that Italy might be next). Formally, when the
Council decides that an excessive deficit exists, the country concerned is obliged to reduce
its deficit below three per cent of GDP according to the recommendations of the Council
or face sanctions at the end of a drawn-out procedure. [2] These ultimate sanctions are
serious. They first take the form of a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Commission of
0.2% of GDP plus a variable component linked to the size of the deficit. Subsequently, the
deposit is converted into a fine if the excessive deficit has not been corrected after two
years. In other words, the once thought "paper deterrent" (or perhaps a dozing dog) turned
out to be a real factor to deal with, especially as core European countries find themselves
in an economic crisis.
 
What are the underlying reasons for the creation of the SGP and what is its immediate
purpose? We distinguish between economic and political reasons. The economic reasons
include that the fiscal provisions in the Maastricht Treaty for maintaining budgetary
discipline were not clearly spelt out and it was felt that additional rules were needed. The
political reasons behind the emergence of the SGP can be traced back to the domestic
circumstances of the Waigel memorandum, based on the perceived need to secure, in a
visible way, a Germanic conception of "stability culture" for the future EMU as well as to
the need to find a political compromise on how to run EMU once stage III had begun.
 
The actual purpose of the SGP was to strengthen the fiscal regime of EMU. It would not
only make the existing rules and exemptions more rigorous, concrete, coherent and
credible, but it would also reduce some ambiguities in the Treaty, such as the originally
very imprecise provisions on sanctions. It is noteworthy that the eventual SGP adopted in
1997 differed considerably from what Waigel had called for. The SGP demands a balanced
budget or even a surplus over the medium term, whereas the original proposal only
suggested a medium term deficit of one per cent of GDP. In addition, Waigel's proposed
automatic sanctions were replaced by a politicised process.
 
The SGP has recently received considerable criticism and will likely remain controversial
as it is being applied. In light of that, this paper poses a number of questions: (1) Why was
the SGP created? (2) What purpose was it supposed to serve? (3) What underlying
conditions supported its creation? (4) Have they changed since? (5) What can be expected
to be its future?
 
The relevant literature on the SGP is dominated by economists. Few authors discuss the
origins of the SGP or the politics of its creation, which is what we find particularly
interesting and intriguing. This paper seeks to understand and provide an analysis of the
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outcome of the SGP negotiations. We argue that the SGP was possible due to a
convergence in basic ideas about the relationship between monetary and fiscal policies
held by the monetary experts in Ministries of Finance, central banks, the Commission and
others in academia and prominent international organisations. Yet there was no consensus
on a specific agreement (if at all). Taking this into account, we seek to explain the process
that led to the convergence that ultimately provided the basis for the compromise that was
found during the Dublin summit in December 1996. Thus, the consensus among experts on
principles was a necessary though not sufficient condition for a political agreement on the
SGP. We offer various power political reasons (e.g. the role of the Bundesbank and
Germany as a prominent Member State) that need to be considered in order to explain the
eventual outcome.
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section examines why the SGP might be
necessary, taking insights from both economics and politics. The second section describes
the actual story of the creation of the SGP. The two subsequent sections offer the core
analysis based on an actor-centred institutionalist approach. The third section examines the
broader framework in which the SGP was created. Under the heading of "actor
orientations" it focuses on the role of ideas, experts and the anticipated shift in broad
political leaning of Member States governments (from right to left). Section four provides
an analysis of the actor constellation. The fifth section draws some lessons from the past
for the current situation. The final section concludes.
 
 
2 Why Might an SGP be Necessary? – Lessons from Economics and Politics
 
2.1  The Economics of the SGP
 
The Maastricht Treaty has provided the monetary constitution for EMU. However, its
specifications for the future fiscal regime are incomplete and ambivalent. [3] It only
contains rather loose stipulations on the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), (TEC Article
104 ex 104c) and budgetary coordination (TEC Article 99-/103 ex 103). From the
viewpoint of economics, several arguments speak in favour of complementing the fiscal
arrangements of the Treaty (for a detailed discussion see Heipertz 2003). The most
prominent reasons behind more stringent rules are (1) a need for consolidation (2) concerns
about externalities, (3) the credibility of ECB independence and (4) the need for a more
coherent framework of economic policy coordination.
 
The first difficulty is a general need for consolidation, resulting from the expansionary
stance of fiscal policy in most of the OECD countries since the "golden age" of
Keynesianism and welfare-state expansion. Soaring interest rates, which were the result of
high inflation rates of the time, reduced investment and contributed to weak growth and
underemployment. Governments found themselves redirecting an increasing portion of
their revenue into debt servicing. Furthermore, ageing populations in Europe imply that
maintaining generous welfare states will be increasingly expensive and will require a
fundamental reallocation of public spending.
 
Second, there are externality problems related to EMU specifically. [4] The most
prominent concern was that Member States would increasingly destabilise each other
involuntarily through negative financial spill-overs of their fiscal policies. [5] A
bond-financed increase in government spending would cause the money supply in the
Eurozone to rise, thereby fuelling inflationary pressures. In response, the ECB would be
forced to increase the interest rate, depressing investment and consumption. Furthermore,
the higher interest rate would cause the common currency to appreciate and the trade
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balance to deteriorate. Another externality effect results from the fact that participating in
a monetary union implies having abandoned national exchange rates. Thus, the absence of
individual national exchange rates entails that the disciplinary effect affects the whole
currency zone, thereby reducing the impact on the individual "sinner" while increasing it
for the others. This effect should aggravate an already existing deficit bias of public
finance (Beetsma 1999). Member States were feared to free-ride on each other in the sense
of under-providing consolidation and overspending on their budgets. [6] Thus strict rules
on budgetary deficits were deemed necessary. It is noteworthy that the need for limits on
budgets had already been mentioned in the original EMU blueprint laid out in the "Delors
Report" (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 1989). Further
justification for limits on budgetary deficits were spelt-out by the Commission
(Commission of the European Communities 1990, 1991).
 
A third concern is that excessive deficits could undermine central bank independence. In
other words, actors at the time were worried that ECB independence and specifically the
"no bail-out" clause [7] of the Treaty (TEC Article 101 ex 104 and 103 ex 104c) would be
politically endangered by unsustainable fiscal paths of certain Member States. Sargent and
Wallace's model of debt monetisation (Sargent/Wallace 1981) supports this view. Their
study shows that an unsustainable fiscal path eventually forces the central bank to buy
government bonds. More recently, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) argues in a
similar direction (Woodford 1994; Leeper 1991). Grossly simplified, the FTPL states that
inflation control by the central bank through the interest rate is jeopardised by an excessive
fiscal stance that disturbs household expectations and unsettles private sector budget
constraints. Public demand substitutes private demand and artificially expands aggregate
demand, eventually causing the price level to rise. Monetary independence, in particular its
effectiveness and its credibility, needs to be supported through the fiscal regime in addition
to the monetary constitution. [8]
 
Fourth, in a monetary union the role of economic policy changes and coordination
becomes pertinent (Begg 2002). The aim of coordination should be to attain an appropriate
policy-mix between monetary and fiscal policy that is required to obtain an efficient use of
these policies. The fact that the "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy of the ECB is
necessarily destabilising for countries with an inflation rate significantly off the Eurozone
average has increased the need for strategic and coordinated fiscal counteraction,
potentially even going beyond the automatic stabilisers. This does not always require fiscal
retrenchment, especially when there is a danger of deflation. The coordination issue grows
in importance with the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and increasing divergence between
the Eurozone economies. Currently, a secular growth-shortfall due to structural rigidities is
amplified by a cyclical recession. A strict interpretation of the pact would require a
contraction to attain the extremely serious magnitude of two per cent (with discretion
applying down to 0.75 per cent) until fiscal counteraction would be authorised. [9] Until
then, governments that have manoeuvred themselves close to three per cent would have to
implement pro-cyclical policies of cutting (investment) expenditures and increasing (tax)
revenues. Many economists have interpreted the SGP in this way and strongly criticised it
for not enabling but – even hindering – countercyclical moves in these cases (Eichengreen
1996; Eichengreen/Wyplosz 1998). The importance and usefulness of stabilisation policy
and even discretionary measures beyond automatic stabilisation is debatable. Instead of
providing the framework for a coordinated and strategic response to the cyclical
component of Europe's weakness, the SGP is seen to stand for rudimentary and improvised
coordination, only asking Member States to "keep their house in order" (Issing 2002).
 
However, this critical view of the SGP underestimates the degree of flexibility that is built
into the legal texts. The pact can be applied "intelligently" in the sense of allowing the limit
to be surpassed for a number of years without losing credibility. This requires both a
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co-operative attitude of the governments concerned and a radical improvement in the
communication of the budgetary situation and medium-term aims. Furthermore, it is
perhaps an unfair criticism to state that the pact is an inferior regime of policy
coordination. After all, the legal documents of 1997 could not transcend but had to be
based on the Treaty, which did not contain any more far-reaching institutional solution on
this issue.
 
 
2.2  The Politics of the SGP
 
The Maastricht Treaty is an incomplete contract as far as rules on EMU are concerned.
The convergence criteria only dealt with the run-up to EMU; however, there were no rules
or arrangements in place for stage III, except the stipulations of Articles 99 and 104 (ex
103 and 104c; see footnote 3 above). Theoretically there were two options. The first would
be the status quo, relying essentially on voluntary arrangements. The Member States would
all agree to continue to meet the convergence criteria even after EMU had started. The
second option was to impose explicit rules that would elaborate on, and even go beyond,
the Treaty stipulations. This issue was left open precisely because it was highly contentious
and exposed fundamentally different views on economic policy. [10] Voluntary
arrangements had been the implicit road that was chosen in the Maastricht Treaty.
However, particularly the Germans and the Dutch favoured a more explicit, rule-based
system. The aim was to restrict budgetary deficits once EMU was fully operational. The
fear was that without rules, it would be very attractive to spend more than the agreed
norm, which would lead to the free-riding problem discussed above. This concern became
especially relevant with respect to a number of (Mediterranean) countries that were
making strenuous efforts to be part of the first wave – against all odds at the outset. [11]
So, the larger the future membership to EMU was appearing to become and the less likely a
postponement, the more urgent the need for Germany to reinforce at least the deficit
criterion. This situation has been described as an "endgame" for the transition towards
stage III (Crowley 2002).
 
We find that a central part of the political background of the pact can be traced back to
German domestic politics. The Stability Pact was a way to comfort public opinion by
appeasing the Bundesbank in particular. There is no doubt that the German public needed
reassurance on EMU. [12] The population had become extremely anxious about giving up
the well-proven Deutschmark (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999) and replacing it with a new
currency that had not proven itself and would not only include traditionally weak
economies, but also lack a tradition of stability culture. [13] Politically, there was a risk
that the opposition and even Waigel's own party in Bavaria under Prime Minister Edmund
Stoiber would capitalise on this sentiment and run on an anti-EMU platform (e.g.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 04.11.1995. Note that at this point in time both men were
contenders for party leadership). Besides the general public, the German monetary
authorities did not trust their counterparts in other Member States. Another factor of
mistrust was that the conservative political parties, still in power in most EU Member
States in the mid 1990s, were concerned that once social democratic parties could come to
power they would start pursuing a "tax-and-spend" policy. Therefore, they were eager to
perpetuate their economic views into the politically indeterminate future. Hence, at the
source of the motivation to propose the SGP, we see a layered prevalence of German
mistrust towards European partners, potential political successors and political discretion in
general.
 
The gradual nature of the process of economic and monetary integration, especially the
experience with the European Monetary System (EMS), was also important. Cooperation
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in the context of the EMS implied that most monetary authorities had contributed to
factual convergence in monetary policy resulting in de facto fixing of exchange rates.
What had been happening over the 1980s was a "shadowing" of Bundesbank policies. The
resulting convergence implied that monetary authorities had learnt lessons about economic
and monetary governance. Yet some feared that national governments would become more
"relaxed" once EMU would be fully operational and return to old practices. The fear was
that, without the disciplining factor of exchange rate fluctuations, governments would
move to more expansionary policies, for example tolerate undue wage increases as well as
expand public debt and implicitly destroy the (anti-inflationary) discipline that had been
built up in many countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
 
Finally, some authors have stressed the fact that EMU was created with too much emphasis
on credibility but much less so on legitimacy issues (Hodson/Maher 2001; Scharpf 2003;
Verdun/Christiansen 2000). The argument is that EMU was created with a strong monetary
authority but with no proper provisions in other domains; that is, it was asymmetrical
(Verdun 1996, 2000). The SGP negotiations were also used as a vehicle to create more
European integration in the economic domain. The choice of a rule-based and mechanistic
strategy can be traced back to the fact that Germany was the most dominant country
regarding monetary matters, and thus able to push through its opinion. On the other hand,
the SGP does not address the concerns that the French and others had, namely that the
ECB should be flanked by an economic government (Verdun 2003). Their initial response
to Waigel's proposal was positive partially due to the opportunity it provided for putting the
cart before the horse. The initially suggested "stability council" seemed to be malleable into
the desired "gouvernement économique." This is precisely why the idea of such a council
was dropped on the other side of the Rhine.
 
Summarising, between 1995-1997 there were sound economic and political reasons to
create a set of rules that would put limits on budget deficits. It was clear that Member State
governments might be tempted to "free ride" once EMU was fully operational. Without
such rules, it would be very attractive for countries to temporarily run a higher deficit
without having to "pay" for that. The costs of that type of policy would have to be borne
by the other Eurozone countries. Because it was obvious that some rules were necessary,
when Germany insisted on a pact that would impose rules, it was in a very strong position
to make its case.
 
 
3 Negotiating the Pact
 
There are very few accounts of the pact's genesis and those that exist are mainly
descriptive (see for example Stark 2001; Passalacqua 2000; Konow 2002 and Costello
2001). The idea of some sort of "stability treaty" was in the air in early 1995, being part of
contributions to the public debate [14] in Germany as well as featuring in informal
discussions of experts and policymakers at the national and European levels. With the
beginning of stage II of EMU (in 1994-95) members of the Monetary Committee started
discussing the idea of more stability oriented rules as the Treaty had stipulated the need for
further legislation (interviews with Members of the Monetary Committee, June and July
2003). Officials in the German Ministry of Finance were also discussing this topic among
themselves during 1994-95. The Bundesbank, in particular, liked the idea of further
legislation because it went some way towards addressing its concerns about a lack of
stability-orientation in EMU. However, at no point before November 1995 did any of these
informal discussions lead to a formal proposal on stability oriented rules. In September
1995 Waigel had been talking to his colleagues informally about his desire to formalise the
rules on budgetary policy in EMU [(Milesi 1998), 95-6 (Stark 2001), 89, and interviews
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with Ministry of Finance officials, June 2003]. Waigel made his move at a time when
public opinion was turning very negative on EMU. Pre-empting the opposition, Waigel
announced his proposal for a "Stability Pact" [15] to the public and his European partners
in November 1995 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 1995) in the second reading on the
1996 budget (Waigel 1995b; Waigel 1995a), reacting to opposition demands for stricter
rules that would guarantee the stability of EMU (Scharping 1995). Waigel was under
pressure to gain the lead in this debate that was becoming politically uncomfortable for the
Kohl government. The fear was that the eurosceptic public opinion could become
politicised and, thus, further mobilised by the opposition. Waigel's behaviour might be seen
as an attempt to pre-empt such a polarisation of the debate on Europe. Therefore, he
commissioned an official in the Ministry at very short notice to write up the ideas on a
Stability Pact that had been discussed for months in order for them to be circulated among
his European colleagues. A second draft, which was completed within three weeks, further
explained the proposal to Waigel's colleagues who, at first, received it favourably
 
After the Danish "no" and the French petit oui in the referenda on the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, there was no question of what was referred to as "opening Pandora's box"
(renegotiating the Treaty). Yet, an intergovernmental agreement, as originally envisaged by
Waigel and his state secretary, Jürgen Stark, was unacceptable to the other countries. At
the same time, the Commission also realised the dangers of an intergovernmental solution
in the form of a new treaty à la Schengen that would imply its marginalisation. The Council
was prompted to propose a solution within the Community framework, which was
prepared under Commissioner Yves-Thibault de Silguy and released in October 1996
[COM (1996) 496]. The proposal turned out to be much closer to the Maastricht Treaty
than to the Waigel paper. Crucially, it did not include automatic fines under the supervision
of an independent "Stability Council," but reduced the sanctions to a discretionary measure
of the Ecofin Council, which evidently comes close to asking turkeys to vote for Christmas
(Begg 2003). On the other hand, the Commission proposal also elaborated on the
"surveillance arm" of the pact, more or less designing the SGP as the rudimentary device
for economic policy coordination that we know today.
 
The Stability Pact dossier went through the various EU committees and institutions. It was
discussed in the Monetary Committee (MC), the Ecofin Council, the European Council
(both prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, COREPER) and at
Franco-German summits, meetings and workshops. The bulk of work was completed in the
MC. Only very few open issues had to be referred to the ministerial level of Ecofin. The
major controversy was that Germany's partners agreed on the principle of mutual
surveillance and reinforced dissuasion of excessive deficits but not on automatic sanctions.
The focal point of dissent became the clause that was going to stipulate the exemptions
from sanctions, since the lever for political discretion laid here. Waigel was completely
isolated in requiring nothing less than a GDP contraction of two per cent or worse as a
qualification for an exemption. The compromise reached in the morning hours of the
Dublin summit in December 1996 stipulates that a recession of less than 0.75 per cent "as a
rule" does not qualify as exceptional, whereas a recession of over two per cent
automatically does. If the recession is in between these two figures, it lies with the Ecofin
Council to determine whether or not the recession is exceptional. The result is a rule that
can be overturned by an Ecofin blocking minority of at least 26 out of 87 weighted votes
or covering at least six member states [TEC Articles 104 VI (ex-Article 104 C VI) and 205
II (ex-Article 148 II] that refuse to label a budgetary deficit of over three per cent as
excessive, depending on the economic situation of the country involved. A voting alliance
against the SGP is, therefore, a concrete and not unlikely possibility.
 
Nevertheless, the SGP has delivered some legal "added value." Among other things, it has
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shortened the timeline of the sanctions mechanism, defined the distribution of the fines
(among the "virtuous" member states), clarified the notion of "exceptional" and
"temporary" deficits as exemptions from sanctions, introduced an urgency procedure,
enabled the suspension of the EDP and, finally, improved the justiciability of the
procedural steps involved. Yet, due to the politicised nature of the EDP, the fundamental
essence of the pact is not a mechanism of "quasi-automatic sanctions," but the
institutionalisation of a political pledge to aim for low deficits. In that way the SGP can be
seen as an act of "symbolic politics" (Sarcinelli 1987). As a face-saving device for the
French, it was renamed "Stability and Growth Pact," since rising unemployment was
increasingly becoming the stumbling stone for the Juppé government. In the official
rhetoric, sound public finances are not an alternative to growth, but a facilitator of the
overall aim of higher growth and more jobs (European Council 1996).
 
 
4 Analysing the Birth of the Stability and Growth Pact
 
In order to analyse the genesis of the pact, we combine two explanatory variables. First,
we see a fundamental role for specific ideas about economic policy in EMU that were held
by experts and that came to underlie the regime created. Second, we believe that only a
combination of those ideas and a supporting power-political constellation enabled the
actual outcome. To show this, we discuss the interaction between the realm of experts and
the realm of politicians. These categories are used to differentiate between the two
variables. Within the political sphere, we locate specific national preference points. These
aggregate positions of countries are ultimately composed of the preferences of individual
actors. Therefore, we lower the level of analysis as far as necessary to arrive at a
satisfactory explanation. Additionally, we discuss the special dynamics of the Franco-
German interaction at the core of the negotiation. Our analysis should explain how and
why positions merged, starting from very different preference points to form a consensus.
 
We choose an actor-centred, institutionalist perspective. First, we focus on how ideas came
to shape the preferences of actors and, second, on how their constellation and interaction
produced the outcome. The analytical approach most suited for this endeavour proved to
be actor-centred institutionalism. According to Scharpf (1997), "actors" are defined as
individual or corporate strategic agents (mostly administrative bodies such as ministries)
which are capable of intentional action. They are also internally organised along
hierarchical lines, and are characterised by preference orientations as well as action
resources. Furthermore, they are embedded in an institutional context, which we use as
explanatory shorthand for structural factors and external influences on the actors
themselves, such as the influential role of financial markets at certain stages in the
negotiation process. We define the executive agents of the negotiating ministries, of the
Commission and of central banks as "experts." They are in contact with non-actor experts,
such as academics, journalists and institutions like the OECD or the IMF, who shape ideas
but not decisions. On the highest levels of deliberations, we introduce non-expert actors,
holding the final and democratically legitimated decision-making competence –
"politicians." The hypothesis is that the orientations of experts are defined by specific
converging "ideas" about economic policy, influenced indirectly by non-actor experts.
Furthermore, the orientations of politicians are crucially influenced by experts, even if
their "ideas" were initially different. We provide a graph that shows how experts (actors as
well as non-actors) and ideas came to shape politics, thereby converging on the
compromise that enabled the conclusion of the Stability and Growth Pact.
 
 
4.1  Actor Orientations
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 Let us first turn to the broader ideational factors that help explain why EMU happened.
The creation of EMU was the result of policy learning, convergence in policies but also in
ideas about monetary policy-making. When EMU was first conceived in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the six Member States were still split on a number of issues. This split was
originally referred to as the difference of opinion of the "economists" versus the
"monetarists" – or to use contemporary language the "coronation" versus "locomotive
view" of economic and monetary union (for a discussion see (Kruse 1980; Tsoukalis 1977;
Dyson/Featherstone 1999). The monetary authorities of the six Member States were split
on how to create EMU (i.e. whether to converge policies first or to move to further
monetary integration and hope that convergence would result). They were also divided on
its main focus (policy objectives) and on the institutional design of EMU (some wanted
immediate transfer of sovereignty to a supranational institution, whereas others were more
cautious). The 1970 EMU plan (also known as the Werner Plan) came at a time when
governments were frequently pursuing Keynesian policies during down-turns (Committee
on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community 1970).
 
Though the actual institutional design of EMU as envisaged by the Delors Committee in
1989 did not differ too much from its 1970 design, a number of important developments
occurred in the years between the two plans. First, economic and monetary integration had
achieved a next level of integration in both the area of economic and monetary policy-
making projects: The process of completing the internal market was underway, financial
markets had become further integrated and the European Monetary System had been
working for a decade. [16] Second, as was mentioned above, policy learning had taken
place. Monetary authorities in the Member States had realised that monetary policies were
only successful if they were in line with that of the dominant Member State, namely
Germany. The Deutschmark played the role of anchor currency. France learnt this lesson in
March 1983 when Mitterrand chose to stay in the EMS and refocus its policies towards
that objective. Italy converged in the second half of the 1980s and was one of the last to
keep exchange rates stable and maintain the lira in the EMS. The EMS witnessed many
devaluations between 1979-1983 but much fewer between 1983-1987. After the
Basle/Nyborg meetings in 1987 until the EMS crises of 1992/1993, there were no
realignments. Third, the ideas regarding monetary policy-making had changed (see inter
alia McNamara 1998 and Marcussen 2000). Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s Keynesian
principles lay still at the heart of national government economic policies, by the late 1980s
monetarist policies dominated. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the United States, the
United Kingdom and Germany were at the forefront of this change, which by the late
1980s had taken place in all West European Member States. The change in belief was that
there was no long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment and that sound
money was important for growth. Hence, policy-makers started putting more emphasis on
the need to keep inflation low to create an economic climate of low interest rates in which
economic growth would be more likely.
 
In their effort to proceed with monetary integration, the governments of Member States
were aided by a so-called "epistemic community." Members of central banks, ministries of
finance and academics held similar views about the main aim of economic and monetary
policy-making. There were a few important venues where experts shared ideas and
socialisation occurred. This took place above all in the Monetary Committee (MC) – now
called the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) – which consists of representatives of
central banks and Ministries of Finance of the EU Member States (Verdun, Amy 2000), as
well as in other influential EC committees (see Rosenthal 1975 and Kruse 1980) and
international fora. The MC convenes in the "comitology" form of an advisory committee
set up according to Article 114 (ex-Article 109 C) TEC. The members of the MC meet
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Haas’ four principles that define the existence of an epistemic community. First, they
shared beliefs for a value-based rationale of social action. Second, they shared causal
beliefs, which are derived from their analyses of problems which then serve as the basis for
understanding the linkages between policy actions and desired outcomes. Third, they have
shared notions of validity – that is intersubjective understandings that help them weigh
ideas within their area of competence. Fourth, they have a common policy enterprise and
common practices associated with a set of problems to which competence is directed (Haas
1992: 3). It is no surprise that the Member States Heads of States or Governments relied on
the MC for proposals and suggestions for action. The literature on epistemic communities
indeed suggests that a group of experts is often called upon when national governments are
unable to come up with a proposal for intergovernmental collaboration. The MC (now the
EFC) is an ideal group to ask for advice as its members can wear double hats: They can act
as independent experts, yet they are fully aware of the political issues at stake. [17]
 
Common ideas on the purpose of economic and monetary policies in the 1980s were
crucial for the creation of EMU in the 1990s. It can be seen as a paradigm shift. It was
accepted by parties of the political left and the political right, as well as by major domestic
actors. Nevertheless, an important political change did occur in the 1990s that could
possibly have challenged this new economic and monetary paradigm. Whereas in the late
1980s many governments in power were of the centre-right, by 1997 this had changed. At
this time, West European governments were typically composed of parties belonging to the
political left. Some observers were concerned that this shift in political leaning might
undermine the paradigm on the basis of which EMU was created. Yet, it is noteworthy that
the period between 1997-2002 did not see any major changes to the institutional design of
EMU. Nevertheless, it is possible that these left-of-centre parties in government will be less
positive to the SGP principles as they restrict governments’ use of budgetary deficits
(traditionally associated with left-of-centre governments). However, what we argue here is
that the shift in paradigm from monetary to Keynesian policies in the 1980s was so
profound that it stretches beyond the usual day-to-day politics of left versus right. Indeed it
is noteworthy that the parties of the political left witnessed a major identity crisis
throughout the 1990s. The political left that came to power in the late 1990s had reformed
itself and no longer subscribed to the traditional principles of many years ago (such as
re-nationalisation or heavy tax-and-spend policies). In fact, it had adopted a number of
principles that traditionally were considered typical for the political right (such as a focus
on market principles and limiting the role of the state). Some argue that the British Labour
Party is the epitome of this transformation in politics and jokingly say that Tony Blair
completed what Margaret Thatcher had started.
 
What mattered at the time was that conservative governments in power were concerned
with their potential left-wing successors not respecting the monetary and budgetary regime
that was being created. However, we note today that this fear was partly unfounded. In the
current situation, we find results that oppose the conventional wisdom. We see left-of-
centre governments willing to restructure and aim at sound monetary and fiscal policies. At
the same time, the fear that support for strict rules could decline was indeed justified
because we find both some left-of-centre and some right-of-centre governments who are
less inclined to take the SGP seriously, at least rhetorically. For example, the current
French government under Jean Pierre Raffarin and the Silvio Berlusconi government in
Italy seem not to be willing to comply with the strict reading of the SGP. Thus, these initial
findings challenge the established view that left-wing governments spend, and right wing
governments aim for balanced budgets.
 
Another change that occurred in the 1990s was economic growth performance. In the first
half of the 1990s growth was sluggish. This was also the reason why the convergence
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criteria were not easily met. Some countries that wanted to be absolutely sure they would
be allowed to join EMU (such as Italy, Spain and Portugal) focused on reforms that they
hoped would lead to a reduction of the budgetary deficit and public debt. Others such as
France and Germany had initially been in a better situation but saw their record deteriorate
over time. All of them found ways to reduce the budget and the public debt, and were
criticised for not playing by the rules (or for engaging in "creative accounting"). The
exclusion from EMU at the outset was such an effective sanction that most governments –
including those of less likely participants of EMU such as Italy and Spain – were willing
and able to proceed with radical reforms, thereby accepting the straightjacket of the
convergence criteria.
 
It was crucial that the actors had learnt certain lessons and shared certain commonly held
beliefs. But those ideas alone were insufficient to produce the concrete SGP. Having
described the changing orientation of actors, we now turn to the strategic pattern of their
interaction, leading to the conclusion of the Stability Growth Pact.
 
 
4.2  Actor Constellation
 
The figure below presents an overview of the most important actors, grouped according to
their resources and initial orientations when Waigel issued his proposal in November 1995
as well as the subsequent convergence. The horizontal axis depicts their politico-
ideologically shaped preferences for or against strict rules for fiscal discipline, whereas the
vertical dimension shows their power resources and decision-making capabilities. We
distinguish between a "political" and an "expert" sphere. Political decision-makers can of
course have considerable relevant expertise, but our distinction highlights the fact that
politicians – not experts – settle the most controversial issues. The stylised process is that
the whole negotiation dossier is split up into a set of issues (timeline, exemptions from
sanctions, distribution of fines etc.) that are discussed at the expert level. Experts receive
their instructions from politicians but are free to reach agreement within these bounds.
Politicians will, in most cases, simply tick off the agreements reached among the experts.
Only issues on which there is no consensus move up for discussion at the political level.
Here, experts can influence politicians since they possess intimate knowledge of the
relevant issue as well as detailed information on the bargaining positions of the other
players. They can indicate potential solutions and possibly prevent the discussion from
being deadlocked. We will now briefly discuss each actor in turn.
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Initial preferences and subsequent convergence
 
 
Actors at the level with the highest resource capabilities are Member State governments.
Their decisive position in the deliberation process corresponds to the concept of "power
politics" (Garret 1994). Agreement among them leads to decisions that are the basis for
laws. The nonetheless important role of other actors is only indirect via the influence they
have on the orientation of the governmental actors. The actual players in the form of state
actors are either Ministers in the Ecofin Council, Heads of State, or Governments in the
European Council. The preference points on this level initially cover the entire range
between pro and contra Waigel’s proposal – obviously Germany being on the right end,
closely followed by the Netherlands, whereas France and other Mediterranean states
initially found themselves on the other side. [18] The German Bundesbank (BBK) figures
as a special player with the resources of an informal veto. We will later discuss in more
detail its double-role between the spheres of experts and politicians. Of the national
treasuries, we only show the two most important ones, the Ministries of Germany and
France. The German Ministry holds a relatively coherent position, showed as a narrow
preference set. On the French side, we find both support and opposition. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume each country to support either France or Germany, depending on
which lies closer to their preference point. [19] Each Ministry and each central bank, plus
the Commission, had two representatives in the Monetary Committee (MC), which was
crucial in preparing the ground for the compromises found in the political sphere. [20] Its
crucial role is best interpreted by the notion of an "epistemic community" as was
mentioned above. In terms of power resources, it lies below national ministries and the
political level, but its importance relates to the fact that it was the actual forum where the
compromise was found. The Commission (at the time under President Jacques Santer and
Commissioner de Silguy) is placed low in terms of decision-making power. However, it
successfully achieved a solution within the Treaty framework, preventing an international
agreement à la Schengen. Such an intergovernmental arrangement would have
marginalised the role of European institutions. Another success for the commission was the
inclusion of the surveillance procedure in the SGP. Yet, it had to depart quite considerably
from its initial preference, which was not very much in favour of stricter rules. The
European Parliament, with a rather negative stance towards a strict pact, was unable to
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bring substantial influence to bear on the deliberations; therefore, it is placed on the lowest
level. Finally, a set of experts not affiliated to any actor previously described was able to
make its influence felt through informal and professional contacts, communication and the
gradual shaping of ideas that underpinned the slow process of ideational convergence: The
European Monetary Institute (EMI), precursor to the ECB, and the central banking
community with a close affinity to the Bundesbank position, should be explicitly
mentioned as well as institutions such as the OECD, academic think-tanks, private-sector
researchers, academics etc. The influence of all their reports, papers, speeches and
statements combined was not directly crucial in the decision-making process but, in our
view, fundamentally shaped the orientations of the political actors and other expert actors
with high levels of resources and access to the political sphere.
 
Initially, actor preferences are widely dispersed., Once it had changed its view and
supported the design of a pact, the Commission was entitled to make its preference the
base for the deliberations in the MC. Here, we find a surprisingly rapid convergence tilted
more towards the right side of the preference scale, the "German" end. One reason is that a
"permissive consensus" (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970) pre-existed already in the MC, whose
members had already been in favour of a stability-oriented, rule-based model. In other
words, the particular equilibrium solution was not yet determined, but the solution space
and, hence, the type of arrangement were already visible.
 
The final result shows that Germany benefited from a privileged position of asymmetric
bargaining power, since it had to make substantially fewer concessions than the countries
from the critical side. This was the case for a number of reasons. First, Germany gave up
the anchor-currency of the preceding regime, the EMS. Therefore, unlike the other
countries, it had to accept the opportunity cost of losing monetary discretion and was able
to ask for a higher price – a fact all too well known from the Maastricht negotiations
(Dyson/Featherstone 1999). Second, the German position resembles Putnam’s two-level
game-constellation with the Bundesbank as an informal veto player (Putnam 1988). Due to
its reputation and popularity, the Bundesbank was extremely influential on German public
opinion towards EMU. If it were to publicly oppose the entry into stage III, it would make
it extremely costly politically for the Kohl government to press ahead. From this
perspective, the SGP is also a way to reduce public resentment through appeasing the
Bundesbank. The effect this had on the negotiations is that the German preference set is
narrowed through the informal (declaratory) veto exercised in Frankfurt; therefore, a
solution has to lie closer towards the German preference point. Third, Germany could –
though at a much higher price than at Maastricht – credibly threaten to exit the process
towards monetary union. Fourth, the second-worst threat-scenario was opposition to the
membership of "Club Med" countries, Italy in particular. It took a whole series of Ecofin
meetings and European summits to implement the MC-outcome in the political sphere. But
eventually, convergence took place, feeding through from lower to higher levels of
resources. For the reasons described, the solution is situated towards the German
preference point. In detail, this means a procedural, legal and especially political
strengthening of the existing provisions that in turn can be traced back to German / Dutch
negotiation positions in Maastricht. The German side had to give in as well. Most
importantly, automatic sanctions had to be dropped from the agreement in favour of
political discretion.
 
We now turn to the institutional context, to be seen as part of the structural framework for
the previously described constellation. Three parallel processes were crucial in shaping and
facilitating the agreement: first, the Franco-German "axis"; second, a process of political
deliberations in the European Council parallel to the Ecofin negotiations; and third,
pressure from financial markets.
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 The Franco-German exchange (institutionalised in the 1963 Elysee-Treaty) is on several
levels equivalent to a sub-set of the negotiations on the European scene. Its most important
function is a radical reduction of the number of negotiators involved, thereby decreasing
the transaction costs of any agreement exponentially increasing the chance of finding a
compromise solution. In our view, these summits are important because France and
Germany not only represent different perspectives on these issues, but also different
groups of countries. As happens in other types of bargaining, it is as if France and Germany
are "delegated" to negotiate a settlement. [21] The actual solution was often not reached
during Franco-German summits or economic consultations, but the subsequent meetings on
the European scene benefited from the prior exchange of views and signals.
 
In addition to the Franco-German deliberation process, the negotiations of the Ecofin
Council were seconded by a parallel political process of summit meetings in the form of
European Councils. Konow (2002) stresses that, unlike the role of the European Council as
defined in the Treaty, the Heads of State or Governments did not confine to providing
merely the initial political impetus. Instead, they punctuated and guided the negotiations
throughout the process, thereby removing important obstacles to compromise, most
notably in the case of the lower end of the definition of a severe recession that would
constitute an exemption from the imposition of sanctions. The European Council did not
only issue strategic political aims, but rather defined operative solutions in surprising detail
and delegated their attainment and the legal framing to the Ministers of Finance as well as
to the Commission.
 
Finally, financial markets were influential in forcing the negotiators to agree on highly
contentious issues. The fact that the Deutschmark rocketed against all other currencies
involved whenever a deadlock seemed to jeopardise the course towards stage III, imposed
a substantial cost of failure on all negotiating partners. This contributed to the omnipresent
desire to reach consensus and made all actors involved rather give in on issues that were
credibly posed as conditiones sine qua non by their counterparts, than leave the
negotiation room with empty hands. To summarise, this section has tried to explain how
ideational convergence, facilitated by asymmetric bargaining power and the institutional
context, enabled a political compromise.
 
 
5 Lessons from the Theory and the Past for the Current Situation
 
Reflecting on the analysis of the history, the politics and the economics of the SGP, what
can we learn about the current crisis? In recent years the budgetary situation of a number
of countries, notably Portugal, Germany, France and Italy has deteriorated. The first three
countries are experiencing the initial stages of the EDP. Why did these problematic
budgetary situations emerge? These countries failed to pursue policies that would lead to a
low budgetary deficit. Part of the reason can be traced back to low economic growth. But
critics would stress that these countries could and should have reduced their spending
when the going was good. In addition, West European countries need structural reform but
governments have put off the necessary unpopular measures. Germany is still facing
additional difficulties because of the financing of reunification. Critics of the SGP stress
that the Maastricht convergence criteria and the SGP limit both monetary and fiscal
policies, thereby reducing the scope for government policies too much. They argue that
governments are effectively unable to pursue countercyclical policies to stimulate the
economy in a downturn. Although procyclicality is a negative side-effect, the SGP gives
Member State governments a constraint that justifies the difficult restructuring of labour
markets and social welfare states. Even in the upswing in the late 1990s, the above-
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mentioned countries avoided these structural changes. The reforms would have placed
their budgets close to balance or in surplus. This budgetary room for manoeuvre would
have allowed cushioning the subsequent downturn without having to run excessive deficits.
 
The reaction to this situation has been diverse. Some politicians have decided to speak out
vocally in favour or against the SGP. Commission President Romano Prodi famously called
the pact "stupid" (Le Monde: 18.10.2002). In contrast, and not surprisingly, ECB President
Willem Duisenberg keeps defending the SGP. His successor, Jean-Claude Trichet, can be
expected to represent an equally, if not even more, committed defender of the pact.
Member State governments themselves have also reacted quite forcefully. Some of the
governments, in particular those of smaller Member States, have complained that they did,
in fact, pursue the necessary disciplinary policies to keep their budgetary deficits under
control. The Dutch Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm, even threatened to take the
Commission to the European Court of Justice if it does not hold France to the SGP (NRC
Handelsblad, 11 September 2003). In taking this strong stance, the Dutch are receiving
support from other small Member States such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and
Spain. They find it unfair that now that the larger Member States are facing the same
difficult situation, their budgets should be allowed to rise and go beyond the agreed ceiling.
This difference in behaviour between large and smaller Member States reinforces the view,
for some, that the EU works with separate rules – for large and small Member States. In
any case, Ecofin Ministers now may have to face the difficult decision of whether or not to
impose sanctions if excessive deficits persist.
 
We argued throughout this paper that the purpose of the SGP is to underline the
importance of fiscal discipline, which comes down in essence to not appropriating the
budget for electoral purposes. The SGP was created to institutionalise that conviction,
thereby protecting and strengthening the credibility of EMU. Even though the sanctions
were designed to scare, the hope was that they would never have to be applied. Indeed the
problem is that the draconian measures that are foreseen, if a country has a prolonged
excessive deficit, are almost too much to actually apply. At the same time we have argued
that EMU still needs to build up its reputation and its credibility. This credibility is at stake
if the formal procedures are tempered with as soon as they become demanding. Beyond
the SGP, EMU’s long-term survival will depend on having a workable regime of fiscal
discipline. There is a risk that EMU will fall apart if all Member States start overspending,
forcing inflation and interest rates up.
 
How should the current situation be handled now that several countries do not meet the
requirements? Should the application of the SGP be relaxed without changing the legal text
and hope that in the future Member States will stick to the rules? The deficits, for example,
could be interpreted as having occurred during "exceptional" circumstances (i.e. reduced
growth because of a major global economic downturn aggravated due to the spring 2003
war in Iraq, SARS, heat waves, floods, etc.). But if this situation in 2003 is deemed
exceptional, then surely the future will bring many other cases that could be labelled
"exceptional." Another change would be to redefine the term "budgetary deficit."
"Investment spending" could be taken out of the deficit, thereby reducing the defined
budget. However, that poses the problem that many countries will define "investments"
differently and it could well lead to creative accounting. Alternatively, should one actually
apply the sanctions to countries such as Germany so that the SGP will finally get some
"bite" and have the other Member States change their behaviour knowing that the fines are
serious? Though this might seem like a wild thought, the German government in principle is
in favour of the SGP. In a sense it would mean that the pact could only be rescued by at
some point applying its rules. Moreover, the critics will still argue that the SGP is bad for
economic growth and that it should not be applied.
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 The overall problem is that if at this point it is decided to tamper with the rules, it will be
very difficult to build-up another credible system of rules and expect Member States to
adhere to them. Even if the current rules are imperfect, they apply in the same way and in
a transparent manner to all Member States. On the other hand, exceptions for specific
Member States under unclear circumstances would undermine the rules. Whether or not
that would be fatal to the continuation of EMU depends on what will be created in its
place. Even a better regime would have to deal with rebuilding credibility. Member States
have invested in the rules and have incurred sunk costs. Thus, switching to another regime
would be costly; substituting the SGP by a vacuum even more so.
 
We think the success of the SGP depends on the economic (and political) performance of
domestic economies in Europe (in terms of growth and employment) and how lack thereof
is being "sold" to the population. The SGP can be used in many ways. If it is used to blame
the European Union for all evil, then the SGP will likely come under further attack and
potentially collapse (with the possible negative side-effects on the credibility of EMU). If
the disciplining effect of the SGP is accepted, then credibility will be assured. It is not
unthinkable that a new regime (or system of rules) may be invented to replace the current
rules. But we feel that it would be better if the Member States chose to make changes to
the SGP when it is not under pressure, but rather when it seems to be doing just well.
 
 
6 Conclusion
 
The watchdog has begun to bark. At the moment, we are waiting to see whether it will
break loose and bite or whether it will be forced to tug its tail and whine. Alternatively,
there is still the chance that its barking is already driving the intruders away from the yard.
We started off by asking why the Stability and Growth Pact was created, what purpose it
was to serve and what underlying conditions supported its creation. We examined a
number of economic and political reasons. We listed five economic reasons. First there was
a need for independent consolidation of the ambition to create EMU. The ambivalences in
the Treaty regarding sanctions and the fact that nothing was formally arranged for the
period in which the transition to the euro had taken place meant that a new arrangement
would need to be made. Second, the fear was that EMU would imply negative fiscal spill-
overs. Third, the normal disciplining effect on national budgets will have disappeared once
EMU is fully operational. A fourth reason is that excessive deficits might undermine price
stability. Finally, given the need for a good policy mix between fiscal and monetary policy,
with monetary policy centralised, more effective fiscal and budgetary policy coordination
is needed. Although the SGP was not intended as a way to do that, it can be used as an
improvised device for that purpose.
 
We also pointed to a number of political reasons that help explain the creation of the SGP.
First, it was unlikely that Member States would respect a common objective (namely to
keep budgetary deficits below three per cent of GDP) without binding rules. But on a more
mundane level, the German domestic political situation forced Waigel to demonstrate to an
increasingly eurosceptic electorate that EMU would be rooted in a firmly embedded
system of rules. EMU was created to institutionalise the German model. Germany had
developed a stability culture and wanted to incorporate that into the EU rules and
regulations governing EMU. This German leadership was possible because of the gradual
process of economic and monetary integration (which had the Deutschmark as an anchor
currency). Convergence had taken place throughout the 1980s and the first part of the
1990s with Germany leading the crowd. This implied that the others had de facto accepted
the monetary regime. At the same time, the type of regime created was supposed to
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reinforce the independence of the European Central Bank. In fact, all possible references
to a Stability Council or any other body that could discuss coordination in EMU was
quickly abandoned in favour of rules on budgets. Thus, the original idea launched by the
Werner Committee to create a Centre for Decision of Economic Policy was never followed
up, nor did the French proposals for a gouvernement économique even get full attention.
 
The actual case study of the creation of the SGP sheds light on the more general question
of why the SGP was created. The case study indicates that its very genesis lay in Germany
and, eventually, was presented as a proposal for an international treaty (à la Schengen) to
colleagues in the Ecofin Council. It soon became evident that reopening the negotiations
on Maastricht was a non-starter. The SGP would be secondary law based on the Treaty
(Articles 99-103 ex 103 and 104 ex 104c). Our analysis of the SGP shows the importance
of ideas on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, and that the role of
monetary policy in society, in general, had changed over time. In the 1970s, Keynesian
ideas dominated, whereas by the early 1980s these views were changing. Groups of experts
(government officials, central bankers, Commission officials, monetary experts in the
Ministry of Finance, researchers, journalists, and academics) all contributed to this
paradigm shift. This transition from Keynesianism to monetarism and the convergence of
ideas regarding the purpose of economic and monetary polities were crucial for the
prevalence of a specific model for EMU. It is noteworthy that the SGP was also brought
into being because the ruling conservative parties (or right-of-centre governments in office
in most West European Member States) feared that successive left-of-centre governments
might overturn these decisions once in power and when seeking re-election.
 
Our paper has analysed the behaviour of the most important actors. The ones highlighted
here are: Member State governments, the German and French Ministries of Finance, the
Bundesbank, the Monetary Committee, the Commission, the European Parliament and
some non-actor experts such as academics and researchers working in the research
departments of central banks, the IMF, OECD, and so on. We assume that governments
have the highest resource capabilities. Besides them, there are other players that take part
in the "game." What is remarkable is that in November 1995 the positions on the SGP were
quite dispersed. Positions converged and moved closer to those of the Bundesbank and the
"monetarists" in the German and French Ministries of Finance. The reason for this, in our
view, is that it was understood that the SGP was to institutionalise the German model,
which in the end had the support of a superior bargaining position. We stress the
importance of common ideas and beliefs among experts about the budgetary regime
required by EMU. Yet, those ideas alone were insufficient to come up with an agreement
on the SGP. In the end power politics is crucial to understand the eventual outcome. In
other words, one could say that a set of commonly held beliefs was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the creation of the SGP. The sufficient condition was the
simultaneous existence of beliefs together with a corresponding power-political
constellation. This setting was generated by the powerful position of Germany (which was
due to its exceptional standing in the field of monetary integration).
 
In the introduction we asked what has changed since 1995/97 and what can be expected
for the future of the SGP in terms of lessons and informed speculations. We find that the
underlying consensus on the SGP assumed that the Member States would have
incorporated into their objectives to actually maintain low budgetary deficits. The elites
(experts) had fully agreed on this matter. However, a number of countries no longer act as
if the SGP budgetary ceilings are to be taken seriously. We stressed that in part it may be
that politicians were opportunistic and thought they could get away with letting the deficits
rise as they had numerous other domestic objectives. At the same time, it is not forgotten
that EMU and the SGP can only have a positive effect on growth if structural reforms are
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implemented. Some governments seem to have ignored the fact that without those reforms,
budgets deficits rise anew. They now wonder whether with the SGP they are facing a
watchdog that only barks but does not bite and is fast on a chain, or whether they have
created a horrible unleashed pit-bull terrier that will drive them over the brink of deflation.
Some have argued that the SGP may not be the right pact to enforce fiscal discipline. But
we have stressed that even though that may be the case, its very effect on credibility
depends on how it gets treated when the going gets tough.
 
At this stage it is too early to speculate boldly about the future of the SGP. Furthermore, as
academics, based on our analysis, and without the gift of crystal ball gazing, we would
suggest that the SGP problems occurred because of the consensus among politicians about
the importance of fiscal discipline seemingly fading away. Yet we argue that there probably
is sufficient support among the main actors (aided by experts) to support the regime. We
would stress once again that the SGP was created to build credibility. Irrespective of
whether it is a "smart" or "stupid" pact, it will only be able to do its job if Member State
governments do not mess too much with it – at least in the short run. We think experts
agree with this analysis, and that they will be influential enough to affect the thinking in
governments. These should want to try to at least seem to be applying the SGP and operate
within its framework, even if they undermine it de facto as far as possible. Time will tell
whether our analysis and subsequent speculations are correct.
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 Notes
 
1
 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a conference at the NYU in London
"Building EU Economic Government: Revising the Rules? 25-26 April 2003, at a seminar
of the Max Planck Institute (MPI) for the Study of Societies, Cologne on 29 April 2003, at
the Oberseminar of the Jean Monnet Chair, of Wolfgang Wessels, University of Cologne on
27 May 2003, at the 19th IPSA World Congress, Durban South Africa, 29 June – 4 July
2003, at the European University Institute on 3 October 2003, and at the University of
Leiden on 6 October 2003. The authors wish to thank the participants of these conferences
and seminars for their useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Patrick Crowley,
Bernhard Ebbinghaus, David Howarth, Kathleen R. McNamara, Britta Rehder, Armin
Schäfer and Fritz W. Scharpf. The authors thank the MPI in Cologne and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council Canada (Grant 410-2002-0522) for financial
support. This paper is based in part on interviews with 25 key informants, who were close
to the actual creation and /or the current politics of the SGP.
 
2
The critical year for the critical case – France – is 2005.
 
3
This lacuna is related to the fact that the negotiating parties were unable to make any
substantial progress in the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1991. The
concluding parties seem to have been aware of the shortcomings and included the
possibility of complementary regulations for the future (TEC Article 99v ex 103v and
Article 104 ex 104c, paragraph 14): "Further provisions relating to the implementation of
the procedure described in this article are set out in the Protocol on the excessive deficit
procedure annexed to this Treaty. The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, adopt
the appropriate provisions which shall then replace the said Protocol. Subject to the other
provisions of this paragraph, the Council shall, before 1 January 1994, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament,
lay down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provisions of the said
Protocol." (Article 104 ex Article 104c paragraph 14)
 
4
Negative externalities are welfare or opportunity costs not fully accounted for in the price
and market system, usually occurring to a third party not being part of the transaction.
 
5
However, recent research suggests that the overall size of fiscal spill-overs within the euro
area can be expected to be rather small as trade and financial spill-overs to a large extent
neutralise each other (Gros/Hobza 2001).
 
6
The deficit bias is partially counteracted through an increase in relative prices in the
expansionary country. The resulting export loss should provide and re-internalise part of
the necessary discipline.
 
7
The no-bailout clause implies that the European Union will not bail-out a national
government if it goes bankrupt (Art 101 ex Art 104; and Art 103 ex Art 104b).
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 8
The logic can be turned on its head. Member States close to the deficit ceiling could argue
that a restrictive monetary stance only pushes them to and eventually over the limit (due to
interest rate payments and lower growth). Instead of "safeguarding the credibility of ECB
independence" (Artis/Winkler 1999), the pact would thereby provide additional
ammunition for governments to exert pressure on the central bank (Willett 1999).
 
9
There are only four cases of recessions exceeding two per cent in the history of the current
Eurozone economies: Italy (-2,7 per cent in 1975), Portugal (-4,3 per cent in 1975),
Finland (-7,1 per cent in 1991), and Sweden (-2,2 per cent in 1993) (Eichengreen/Wyplosz
1998).
 
10
A third option would be to have a new economic authority make decisions about these
matters. This idea was first raised in the 1970 Werner Report which offered a blueprint for
EMU (Committee on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the
Community 1970). It referred to this organ as a "Centre of Decision for Economic Policy."
In the late 1980s, the French produced a similar idea when they called for a
"gouvernement économique." The creation of such a body has thus far not taken off due to
the fear that that it might undermine the independence of the ECB.
 
11
Ironically, in 1996 it became public that Germany itself had breached the three per cent
limit for the first time in 1995.
 
12
According to Eurobarometer data (MM4/95), 65 per cent of the German public were
opposed to a single currency in the first half of 1995 (Commission of the European
Communities 1995).
 
13
German public opinion was heavily influenced by a "manifesto" of sixty German
economists against the Maastricht Treaty (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 11.06.1992)
and a ruling of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG 89, 155) in 1993, demanding
EMU to be geared towards monetary stability. Even more prominent was the continuous
stream of criticism coming from the Bundesbank, starting with (Deutsche Bundesbank
1992).
 
14
Influential was a speech given by the President of the German association of cooperative
banks, the Bundesverband der Volksbanken und Raiffeisenkassen, Wolfgang Grüger, who
proposed to conclude an intergovernmental stability treaty among the future EMU states
(Handelsblatt: 09.05.1995).
 
15
The military term "pact" had become quite fashionable in German symbolic politics after
two failed attempts at crafting a "Solidarity Pact" for the financing of reunification in 1993.
Note also the "Stability Pact for the Balkans," originally proposed in 1993. The term "pact"
has also been used in various other Member States in the context of "tripartite social
pacts," for example in Italy, in order to restructure pensions. In this sense the term "pact" is
used to provide a sense of social concertation as it signals collaboration among various
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 actors (in Germany for example restructuring would require the collaboration from the
social partners – trade unions and employers’ associations).
 
16
Note that the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was still formally operational
in 1970 but was starting to show signs of breakdown, which eventually happened on 15
August 1971. In the following years the snake was created, which was a system of fixed
but adjustable exchange rates in which most but not all EC Member States (and sometimes
a few non-EC Member States) participated. The snake was not very successful as there
were frequent realignments and the currencies of various countries, notably France,
dropped out a number of times.
 
17
One participant described their role as "financial diplomats" (interview with the authors in
July 2003).
 
18
The preference set is large since the initially positive response to Waigel’s proposal has to
be seen as rhetoric because it did not include true assent to its most important component,
automatic sanctions.
 
19
According to Scharpf (1997), we assume that different positions within a ministry
disappear as consensus is imposed upon the officials. This happens through hierarchical
direction and the "shadow of hierarchy" within the organisation.
 
20
Formally, the sessions of the European Council as well as of the Ecofin Council are
prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) according to
Article 207 (ex-Article 151) TEC, which de iure involves the foreign offices of the
member states in the process. We disregard this peripheral scene of negotiation on
monetary matters and take the de facto preparatory role of the MC as decisive. The MC
convened at two levels. At the higher level, the representatives of Ministers (state
secretaries or junior ministers) and Deputy Governors of the central banks met. At the
lower level, that of the so-called "alternates," the committee met to deal with a range of
detailed technical issues.
 
21
Milesi (1998: 145) quotes a delegation member of the Dublin summit: "C'est un problème
franco-allemand (…) Mettez-vous d'accord entre vous et nous accepterons votre solution."
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